With all that is going on in the federal government, interest-based bargaining (IBB) is probably the last thing on the minds of most federal employees…and rightfully so. For many of us that spent or are spending their careers implementing the various executive orders of both parties, there has always been tension between traditional, position-based, and pure interest-based bargaining practices.
According to those that are proponents of interest-based bargaining, an interest-based negotiation is characterized as one in which:
- The parties share the interests that underlie their issues and try to jointly negotiate a solution that satisfies all parties.
- The intent is to reach a mutually acceptable outcome, something that is mutually beneficial to both parties, and the interests of both parties are being met.
- The parties use a collaborative approach to resolving labor and management disputes. Through the process, parties proactively identify durable solutions to outcomes at the bargaining table. Agreements are based on mutual and individual interests rather than positions. This approach emphasizes problem-solving and enables mutual gain outcomes.
I spent a significant part of my career negotiating agreements and, in my opinion, in the federal sector, pure, and I do mean pure IBB, in practice is problematic, if not impossible. In federal sector negotiations, the idea that every brainstormed option is a legitimate possibility worthy of evaluation is naive, if not deceptive.
Most IBB processes and techniques include having the parties to the negotiations brainstorm ideas to address the parties’ individual and mutual concerns. In most cases, those brainstormed ideas are usually not guided by the political atmosphere at the time.
In today’s environment, and when I say today’s environment, I mean the last 20 years (I’m old), pure IBB may not be a useful approach. In reality, agency officials have very few, if any, options regarding the implementation of an Administration’s initiatives. Not only have they been told what the various programs will be, they’re provided “suggestions” regarding how it will be implemented. If you think that these “suggestions”, (if not orders) were limited to this Administration, you have a very short memory.
For example, the previous Administration had agency officials renegotiate any collective bargaining agreement that was influenced by its predecessor’s executive orders, even though those agreements were legal and binding. I doubt that there were many agency leaders that thought expending agency funds to renegotiate agreements that provide more union official time, free equipment for unions, and more items that could be grieved, met their collective interest. Now, Trump 2 has levied numerous controversial requirements on agencies, leaving little to no agency discretion, especially since the Administration communicated directly to employees about the terms of the initiatives, something normally subject to collective bargaining.
While I won’t opine on the wisdom or legality of either Administration’s approach, they all seem to present situations that raise questions regarding if pure IBB is, or can be, a legitimate approach to collective bargaining.
In my opinion, when dealing with the political mandates of both parties, where options are limited or in some cases directed, the parties would be better suited to recognize that at best, a blend of both traditional and interest-based methodologies may be the most realistic approach to collective bargaining.
